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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether certain 
exchange rate arrangements are more prone to currency crises using a 
probit model. We define a currency crisis as a period characterised by the 
presence of intense foreign exchange market pressure. The definition is 
based on a foreign exchange market pressure index (MPI). If the value of 
the MPI is above a certain threshold, we define that period as a crisis state; 
otherwise the period is defined as a tranquil state. The definition of currency 
crises used in this paper focuses on discrete events.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the financial crises of the 1990s in emerging markets, the issue of the suitability of 
exchange rates regimes has returned to the international finance research agenda. More 
precisely, the debate over fixed and floating exchange arrangements has once again taken 
centre stage in academic circles. Some economists maintain that the first round of this debate 
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Mandilaras, Paul Levine, Vasco Gabriel, Keith Pilbeam and Mariel García for many helpful comments on the 
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Federico Sturzenegger, Jeannine Bailliu, Robert Lafrance, Jean-François Perrault, Atish R. Ghosh, Anne-Marie 
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was won by those advocating floating arrangements because all crisis episodes took place in 
countries which had adopted a variety of mechanisms for pegging their exchange regimes. 
Conversely, the advocates of fixed exchange regimes suggest that there are bad fixes and 
good fixes (like official dollarization) and good or truly fixed arrangements that allow countries 
to achieve credibility.  
 
An important recent development in the debate over optimal exchange rate regimes is the 
recognition that the choice of an exchange rate arrangement is different between particular 
groups of countries. The choice of an exchange rate regime for developed countries is 
different from the one of developing countries or emerging economy countries. Developing 
countries are often beset by a lack of credibility and limited access to international capital 
markets. Hence, fixed exchange rate regimes play a useful role by providing policymakers with 
a nominal anchor for monetary policy and by helping to establish a degree of policy credibility. 
In contrast, emerging market economies are more integrated with global financial markets but 
they have encountered more currency crises under pegged exchange rate arrangements 
(Husain et al., 2005). Developed countries have obtained more benefits from flexible exchange 
regimes because they are more developed economically and institutionally, and more 
integrated in global financial markets (Rogoff et al., 2003). 
 
Contrary to a large number of theoretical studies in the literature, relatively few studies 
attempt to empirically investigate the impact of an exchange rate regime on currency crises in 
developed, emerging and developing countries, separately. This is perhaps, because such an 
empirical investigation is fraught with difficulties, including the problem concerning the 
classification of exchange arrangement. This article addresses the issue of measurement 
errors in the classification of exchange rate regimes by using four different classification 
schemes. Three de facto and one de jure classifications are used. Consequently, the 
sensitivity of these results to alternative exchange rate classifications is also tested. The 
principal conclusion emerging from this study is the following: emerging and developing 
countries adopting fixed exchange rate arrangements have a lower probability of currency 
crises.  
 
The remainder of this article is organised in the following way: Section 2 shows a brief 
review on exchange arrangement classifications. Section 3 presents a brief literature review 
focusing on the link between exchange rate regimes and currency crises. Section 4 discusses 
the issues of exchange market pressure indicators and currency crises. Section 5 describes 
the empirical framework. A preliminary analysis of the data is presented in Section 6. Section 7 
reports empirical findings. Section 8 concludes the findings of this article. 
2 Regime Classification 
A common problem in the empirical analysis of exchange rate systems is regime 
classification. The literature identifies two approaches to this problem: the de jure classification 
and the de facto classification. The former classifies countries by what they say they do (de 
jure). However, countries often act differently to what they declare they do. In particular, a self-
declared independent floating regime, in reality, often operates a managed peg regime. This 
phenomenon of operating a disguised peg is referred to as "fear of floating" (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). Classifying countries by what they actually do is a de facto classification. 
Some authors develop de facto classifications using various methods (Ghosh et al., 1997; 
Bailliu et al., 2001; Poirson, 2002; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Shambaugh, 2004; Dubas et al., 2005; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005; Bérnassy-Quéré 
et al., 2006; Frankel and Wei, 2008; Ilzetski et al., 2010), but these are fundamentally based 
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on data that presents the behaviour of nominal exchange rates, international reserves and 
interest rates2. 
Some empirical studies simply employ the de facto classification because the de jure 
classification may reach incorrect results3, particularly about floating regimes. On the other 
hand, some research employs the de jure classification arguing that it suffers from less 
drawbacks than the de facto classification4. 
In this article we employ a combination of three de facto and one de jure classifications. 
Firstly, we use the de facto classification developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005), 
henceforth known as the "LYS classification". These authors apply a cluster analysis to a data 
set with three variables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, 
and the volatility of international reserves from all IMF reporting countries in the period 1974-
2000. Secondly, the "natural classification" developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is 
employed. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) reclassified exchange rate regimes based on market 
determined dual and parallel exchange rates, and use official rates only if the exchange rates 
are unified5. These authors examine the chronologies of the exchange rate history for 153 
countries in the period 1946-2001. They are able to distinguish among floating by high inflation 
countries (freely falling) from floating by others. They define the category of "freely falling" 
rates when the 12-month rate of inflation exceeds 40% and when, during these periods of high 
inflation there is no official announcement of the regime by the authorities6. In addition, they 
define hyperfloats as those episodes of macroeconomic instability that are characterised by 
hyperinflation where the monthly inflation rate is 50% or more. Thirdly, an alternative 
classification scheme developed by Bailliu et al. (2001) is used. These authors develop a 
Hybrid Mechanical Rule (HMR) classification. This system classifies exchange rate regimes in 
terms of their observed flexibility and takes into account external shocks and revaluations. 
Their analysis is based on a sample of 60 countries for the period 1973-1998. Finally, the de 
jure classification from the IMF is used7. 
In our analysis all the different classifications are grouped into three broader regimes: 
fixed, intermediate and floating exchange rate regimes (see Table 1). Managed floating is 
classified under the floating category, with respect to the term managed, in the context of the 
Reinhart-Rogoff classification, does not necessarily imply active or frequent foreign exchange 
market intervention.  
 
 
 
                                               
2 To a literature reviews on why many countries follow de facto regimes different from their de jure regimes see 
Cruz-Rodríguez (2013). 
3 This could be the results of measurement error in the classification of exchange rate arrangements. 
4 The de facto classification has the advantage of being based on observable behaviour, but it does not capture the 
distinction between stable nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and stability that stems 
from policy actions offsetting shocks. More importantly, it fails to reflect the commitment of the central bank to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market. Although the de jure classification captures this formal commitment, it falls 
short of capturing policies inconsistent with the commitment, which lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the 
parity. 
5 In case where there are no dual or multiples rates or parallel markets are not active. 
6 In situations where the currency crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed 
or independently floating regime, they label an exchange rate as freely falling during the six months immediately 
following a currency crisis. 
7 The data on the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from Ghosh et al. (2002) and from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
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Table 1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Fixed Intermediate Floating 
De facto Classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenerger 
(1) Fixed (2) Crawling peg 
(3) Dirty floats 
(4) Float 
De facto Classification by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(1) No separate legal tender 
(2) Pre-announced peg or 
currency board arrangement 
(3) Pre-announced horizontal 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(4) De facto peg 
(5) Pre-announced crawling 
peg 
(6) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ± 2% 
(7) De facto crawling peg 
(8) De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to ± 
2% 
(9) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is wide than or equal 
± 2% 
(10) De facto crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal 
to ± 5% 
(11) Moving band that is 
narrower than or equal to ± 
2%   
(12) Managed floating 
(13) Freely floating 
(14) Freely falling 
(15) Hyperfloating 
De facto Classification by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(1) Currency boards 
(2) Single currency peg 
(3) Basket pegs 
(4) Crawling pegs with narrow 
bands 
(5) Flexibility index ≤ 1 
 
(6) Flexibility index ≥ 1 
 
De jure Classification by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(1) Pegged regimes (2) Intermediate regimes (4) Floating regimes 
 
Note: Inconclusive classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger are not considered in our analysis.  
Sources: Bailliu et al. (2001); Bailliu et al. (2003); Ghosh et al. (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenergger (2005). 
3 Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: A Survey of 
the Literature 
Earlier contributions to the theoretical literature on currency crises pointed almost 
exclusively to deteriorating economic fundamentals as the trigger for currency crises. 
However, few studies have made an attempt to investigate empirically whether a particular 
exchange rate regime is more prone to a currency crisis. Some empirical research suggests 
that currency crises are more likely to occur under fixed or intermediate exchange regimes. 
However, a study developed by the IMF (1997), based on the IMF's de jure classifications, 
finds that close to half of the currency crashes (sharp changes in the exchange rate) occur 
under floating regimes, implying that crises can arise under both pegged and floating regimes8. 
Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) find that de jure pegged regimes have the lowest probability of a 
                                               
8 An important observation is that many exchange rate regimes are improperly classified as flexible when they are in 
fact, pegged regimes. 
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currency crisis9. Likewise, Falcetti and Tudela (2006) show that currency crises in developing 
and emerging markets are less frequent under de jure fixed exchange rates than under de jure 
flexible regimes in the period 1970-1997. On the other hand, Rogoff et al. (2003) find that 
currency crises tend to occur more frequently in de facto intermediate regimes especially in 
emerging markets. Similar conclusions are drawn by Peltonen (2006) who finds, using the de 
facto classification from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), that emerging markets with more rigid 
exchange rate regimes were less prone to currency crises during the last two decades. 
Empirical case studies conducted by Jakubiak (2001) demonstrate that a floating exchange 
rate regime does not guarantee an emerging country avoiding a currency crisis. Haile and 
Pozo (2006), using the IMF's de jure and the LYS de facto classifications analyse the 
incidence of currency crises in emerging markets according to the exchange regime in place 
between 1974 and 1998. Their results suggest that the de facto exchange regime plays no 
role in determining currency crisis period. As a consequence, fixed exchange regimes that are 
not truly fixed appear to invite speculation against the currency, increasing the likelihood of 
currency crisis. 
In the same way, Bubula and Otker-Rober (2003), using their own de facto 
classification10, find that pegged regimes, as a whole, are more prone to currency crises 
compared with floating regimes, particularly for developed and emerging market economies 
that are integrated with international capital markets, in the period 1990-200111. On the 
contrary, Coulibaly (2009), using panel data of 192 countries from 1970 through 1999, and 195 
currency crisis episodes, examines the effect of membership in a currency union on the 
probability of experiencing a currency crisis. Both parametric and non-parametric estimates 
suggest that membership in a currency union reduces the likelihood of a currency crash. 
Angkinand et al. (2009), using a logit model and a panel of 90 countries observed annually 
from 1990 to 2001, show that results from using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) regime are that 
middle regimes such as adjustable parities, crawls, and moving bands are relatively prone to 
crises, while managed floats have the lowest probability of crises among intermediate regimes. 
However, when authors turn to LYS classification, they do not find any significant result in 
explaining the correlation between exchange rate regimes and currency crises. 
Esaka (2010a) examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the 
incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. The author 
employs the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and finds no evidence that 
intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard 
pegs and free floats. Similarly, Esaka (2010b) examines whether de facto exchange rate 
regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by 
using the probit model and the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). His 
results show that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises 
compared with floating regimes. On the other hand, Asici (2011) applied a multinomial logit 
framework to 163 developed and developing countries over the period from 1990 to 2007. His 
regression results suggest that countries experiencing currency crisis are those that have 
chosen regimes inconsistent with their individual features. 
Karimi and Voia (2014) analyze the effect of exchange rate regimes and capital 
account liberalization policies on the occurrence of currency crises for 21 countries over the 
period of 1970-1998. The authors examine changes of the likelihood of currency crises under 
de jure IMF classification and two de facto exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff and 
LYS). Their results show that the likelihood of currency crises changes significantly under de 
                                               
9 However, the impact of a currency crisis is more severe under pegged and intermediate regimes than under 
floating regimes. 
10 For details on this classification, see Bubula and Otker-Rober (2002). 
11 They define currency crises as episodes of severe market pressures, reflected by sharp movements in both 
exchange and interest rates. 
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facto regimes. While Reinhart and Rogoff based models show that fixed exchange rate 
arrangements are least susceptible to speculative attacks, LYS based models point to the 
intermediate exchange rate regimes as the least crisis prone. However, Esaka (2014), using 
data on currency crises and exchange rate regimes from 84 countries for the period of 1980–
1998 and the de jure IMF classification to identify official announced exchange rate regimes 
and the de facto Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classification, evaluates the treatment effect of 
consistent pegs on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are 
indeed more prone to currency crises than other regimes. Using matching estimators as a 
control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, the author finds that countries with 
consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with 
other exchange rate policies. On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2015) using the IMF de facto 
classification12 and a sample of 50 emerging economies over the 1980-2011 period, show that 
macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities are significantly greater under less flexible 
intermediate regimes, including hard pegs, as compared to floats. Conversely, Combes et al. 
(2016) revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes. Using a panel of 90 
developed and developing countries over the period 1980-2009, and two de facto 
classifications (the IMF de facto classification and the Ilzetski et al., 2010, classification). Their 
results reject that intermediate regimes are more vulnerable to crises compared to the hard 
peg and the fully floating regimes. 
4 The Exchange Market Pressure Indicator and Currency 
Crisis Periods 
In any empirical analysis of currency crises, the first issue is to define the nature of a 
crisis. A currency crisis can be understood as a sudden decline in the confidence to an 
individual currency usually leading to a speculative attack against it. Since, in a currency crisis 
situation, a speculative attack may lead to sharp currency depreciation, an increase of interest 
rates and/or a substantial reserve loss, the most straightforward approach is to employ an 
index of speculative pressure13. This technique is common in the empirical literature on 
currency crises. The exchange market pressure indicator was originally developed by Girton 
and Roper (1977) to describe the composite behaviour of nominal exchange rates and 
international reserves, and later modified by Eichengreen et al. (1996). In the interest of 
measuring currency crises Eichengreen et al. (1996) add a third term: changes in the nominal 
interest rate. The idea behind this is that an excess demand for foreign exchange can be met 
through several channels. Depreciation or devaluation occurs if the speculative attack is 
successful, but monetary authorities may instead accommodate the pressure by running down 
their international reserves or deter the attack by raising interest rates. This methodology, 
which identifies currency crises using an exchange market pressure indicator, has been 
followed, in principle, by Sachs et al. (1996); Kaminsky et al. (1998); Tudela (2004); Peltonen 
(2006); Haile and Pozo (2006); Falcetti and Tudela (2006), among others. 
                                               
12 Critics constantly moved away from the official International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification to construct a de 
facto classification system in 1999. The new IMF classification combines the available information on exchange 
rates and monetary policy frameworks, and the formal or informal policy intentions of authorities, with data on actual 
exchange rates and reserve movements to reach an assessment of the actual exchange rate regime (Habermeier et 
al., 2009, provide information on revisions to this classification system in early 2009). However, it can be argued that 
the new IMF classification system is still one of the de jure regimes, since it still relies heavily on official information 
and looks mainly at the behaviour of official exchange rates (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). 
13 In theoretical literature, a currency crisis is mostly defined only in the case of fixed exchange rate regimes, usually 
as the official devaluation or abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. However, this definition is not flexible 
enough to serve a use in empirical research, since many currencies are not formally pegged to a specific currency 
and many countries use various forms of floating exchange rate regimes. 
7 of 18 
In this article, the exchange Market Pressure Indicator (MPI) is calculated as the weighted 
average of percentage changes in the exchange rate (e), percentage changes in the interest 
rate (i), and percentage changes in international reserves (r)14, using the United States as the 
country of reference15. The exchange market pressure index is defined as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐼 = 𝑤1∆𝑒 + 𝑤2∆𝑖 − 𝑤3∆𝑟                                                             (1) 
                    
where e represents the price of US$1 in domestic currency, i the interest rate, and r 
international reserves. Since the volatilities of foreign reserves, exchange rates and interest 
rates are very different, the weights w1, w2 and w3, attached to each component are used to 
equalise the volatilities of each of the three MPI components, thereby preventing any one of 
them from dominating the index, and are defined as the inverse of the standard deviation of 
each of the individual series. Formally: 
 
𝑤𝑗 =
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑗
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒
+
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖
+
1
𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑟
                                                               (2) 
 
where j stands for any of the three variables and StDev stands for the standard deviation. 
According to equation (1), if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, a speculative attack 
may lead to sharp currency devaluation, an increase of interest rates and/or a substantial 
foreign reserve loss. On the other hand, if a country has a flexible exchange rate regime, a 
speculative attack may lead to sharp currency depreciation, and then to an increase of interest 
rates and/or a substantial international reserve loss, but only if monetary authorities want to 
deter the attack. 
A crisis period is defined to occur when the value of the MPI exceeds an arbitrary 
threshold16. Following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we define crisis periods as MPI values that 
are greater than 1.5 standard deviations over the mean of the series. Formally: 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑀𝑃𝐼 > 𝜇𝑀𝑃𝐼 + 1.5𝜎𝑀𝑃𝐼
0                              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                    (3) 
 
where µMPI and σMPI denote the mean and the standard deviation of the sample of the MPI. 
Hence, a crisis takes place for an individual country when its MPI variable takes an "extreme" 
                                               
14 A decrease rather than increase in international reserves is used, since an increase in speculative pressure tends 
to increase the exchange rate and the interest rate, but tends to reduce foreign reserves. 
15 Variables in logarithms. 
16 Unsuccessful speculative attacks are also included in our definition of a currency crisis since they point to the 
vulnerability of the system reflected or that can be seen in a fall in international reserves and a rise in interest rates. 
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positive value17. The total number of crises identified is 227 (43 in advanced, 52 in emerging 
and 132 in developing countries) and about 88% of the countries experienced at least one 
currency crisis over the sample period18. The MPI is a continuous variable, while our currency 
crisis definition is a discrete binary variable. Also, the last definition is sensitive to the threshold 
used. 
5 Empirical Methodology 
The analysis of the relation between exchange arrangements and currency crises will be 
based on the discrete choice model method (probit model). Given our indicators, the model 
estimates the probability of a currency crisis. The estimated model takes the form: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽𝑡)                                                     (4) 
 
where xt corresponds to our set of indicators and βt is a vector of unknown parameters. The 
observed variable yit assumes a value of 0 or 1 depending on whether a currency crisis has 
occurred or not. With a probit model, the right hand side of the model is constrained between 0 
and 1, and is compared to the observed value yit. The probit model assumes that the 
probability distribution function (yit conditional on xit) corresponds to normal distribution. The 
model with a success probability F (xit, βt) and independent observations leads to the joint 
probability.  
6 The Data 
The sample consists of panel data for 125 countries classified by the World Bank 
according to their income. Advanced or developed countries are those economies classified as 
upper income countries. Emerging markets countries are defined according to the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index19 at that moment. The rest of the countries are 
designated as developing. Table 2 provides a list of countries classified in each group. 
The data set is annual, spanning from 1974 through to 1999. Data availability differs 
across countries. Particularly, the data for East-European countries which starts from the 
1990s.  
 
 
                                               
17 We use country specific thresholds because the standard deviations are computed within each-country and not 
for the whole sample. 
18 For an analysis of sensitivity to different threshold we use the MPI greater in value than 1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 2.0, 2.5 
and 3.0 standard deviations over the country's own mean value. The total of number of crises according to the 
conventional criterion of 2.5 or 3.0 standard deviations are very small (50 and 25 respectively). Similarly, the total of 
number of crises when we use high threshold (mean plus 1.7 or 2.0 standard deviations) are 164 and 101, 
respectively. On the contrary, when we use low threshold (mean plus 1.3 standard deviations) we obtained 295 
crises. However, when we use the threshold of mean plus 1.4 or 1.6 standard deviation we obtained 256 and 195 
crises, these results are closer to those obtained when we use 1.5 standard deviations. 
19 The MSCI index classifies a country into an emerging market in line with a number of factors relating to 
international capital market access. 
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Table 2: List of Countries 
Advanced 
Countries 
Emerging  
Markets 
Developing  
Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Egypt 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Rusia 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameron 
Chad 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabon 
Gambia, the 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kazahstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lao Dem. 
Rep. 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger  
Nigeria 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Slovak Rep. 
Sri Lanka 
St. Lucia 
St. Kitt & Nevis 
St. Vicent & Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Note: Emerging market economies are those that are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
index. Advanced economies are those that are classified as upper income economies by the World Bank, with the 
exception of Israel, which is in an emerging market. The remaining countries were designated as developing 
countries. 
 
Most of the macroeconomic and financial variables used in our analysis are taken from 
the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's World Economic Outlook 
databases. A few series are taken from the CD-ROM version of the International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistic (IFS). The data from the de jure IMF classification can 
be obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions and Ghosh et al. (2002). For the Market Pressure Index (MPI) calculations, we 
employ total non-gold international reserves, average period exchange rates and short-term 
interest rates. Money market rates were used for all the countries where available, and t-bill 
rates, bank lending or deposit rates otherwise; in a number of cases, discount rates were 
used, when no other interest rate data were available (see Table 3).  
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Table 3: Interest Rate Used for the Corresponding Countries 
Money Market T-bill Bank Lending Bank Deposit Discount 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
Canada 
Croatia 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Zimbabwe 
Belgium 
France 
Guyana 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyz Rep. 
Lesotho 
Moldova 
Romania 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Dominica 
El Salvador 
Er. Guinea 
Estonia 
Gabom 
Grenada 
Honduras 
Israel 
Liberia 
Macedonia 
Nigeria 
Panama 
Poland 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Zambia 
Algeria 
Bolivia 
Chile 
Dominican Rep. 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Lao Dem. Rep. 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Madagascar 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nicaragua 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. of 
Costa Rica 
Cyprus 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
India 
Ivory coast 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Peru 
Portugal 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Venezuela 
 
Notes: Money Market is the rate on short-term lending between financial institutions. Treasury bill rate is the rate at 
which short-term securities are issued or traded in the market. Lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the 
short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated according to the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and objectives of financing. Deposit rate usually refers to rates offered to resident 
customers for demand, time or saving deposits. Discount rate is the rate at which the central banks lend or discount 
eligible paper for deposit money banks, typically shown on an end-of-period basis. 
 
The variables used in this analysis and their descriptions are listed in Table 4. These 
variables were selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical literature. 
Government balance is defined as current and capital revenue and official grants received, 
less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. This variable considers central 
governments only. Short-term debt is defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year 
or less. Available data does not permit a distinction between public and private non-
guaranteed short-term debt. The ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of 
domestic currency holding and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other 
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking institutions. 
Money and quasi money are defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits 
other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This definition of money supply 
is frequently called M2. Foreign direct investment is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
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earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
Current account balance is the sum of the credits less the debits arising from international 
transactions in goods, service, income, and current transfers. Unemployment refers to the 
share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
International reserves are the sum of a country's monetary authorities’ holdings of special 
drawing rights, its reserve position in the IMF, its holdings of foreign exchange, and its holdings 
of gold. Variables expressed in US dollar were converted to the natural logarithmic scale. The 
rest of variables were expressed in percentage. Finally, floating and intermediate exchange 
rate regimes are identified with a dummy variable that received the value of one in which these 
regimes prevail in a country in a particular year.  
 
Table 4: List of variables used in the estimations 
Variable Description 
Gov. Balance 
Stdebratio 
Debt 
Domfin 
Debtsx 
Bnkres 
Dcrep 
M2gdp 
M2res 
Resdebt 
Resimp 
Fdigni 
Cagni 
Inflation 
Unempl 
Usirate 
Reserves 
Per capita GDP 
Real GDP 
Openness 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Central government balance (% of GDP) 
Short-term debt/Total debt (%) 
Total debt/GNI (%) 
Domestic financing, total (% of GDP) 
Debt service/Exports of goods and services (%) 
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets (%) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 
Money and quasi money (% GDP) 
Money and quasi money (% Reserves) 
Reserves/Total debt (%) 
Reserves/Imports of goods and services (%) 
Foreign direct investment (% of GNI) 
Current account balance (% GDP) 
The consumer price index (%) 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
USA short-term interest rate (%) 
International reserves (US$) 
Per capita real GDP growth (%) 
Real GDP growth (%) 
Exports plus imports of goods and services (% GDP) 
Dummy variable capturing float exchange rate regimes 
Dummy variable capturing intermediate arrangements 
 
Notes: The table does not include the dependent variables, which are explained in the text. Variables expressed in 
US dollars were converted to the natural logarithmic scale for the purpose of estimation. 
7 Estimation Results 
In order to examine which exchange arrangements are more prone to a currency crisis we 
use a probit model where the dependent variable is the probability of a currency crisis and the 
independent variables are all the above-mentioned variables simultaneously (not reported), 
but insignificant variables were gradually eliminated, until the most parsimonious 
representation of the data was achieved20. 
The impact of exchange regimes on the probability of currency crises is shown in Tables 5 
and 6. The signs of independent variables are mostly as expected. Also, the statistical 
characteristics of the models are favourable. Most variables are significant to the level of 10%. 
                                               
20 However, in some cases the dummy variables of exchange rates were statistically not significant but they are not 
excluded. 
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The LR statistic shows the general statistical significance of the models (zero hypothesis of no 
significance of all the coefficients in the models was rejected with a significance of 1%)21. 
However, McFadden R2 indicates relatively low goodness-of-fit in the models (between 5% 
and 28%).  
 
Table 5: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Currency Crises in  
All Countries and Advanced Economies 
 
 All Countries Advanced Economies 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant -1.26 
(-6.80)* 
-1.69 
(-8.31)* 
-1.08 
(-4.99)* 
-1.20 
(-7.08)* 
-1.58 
(-4.94)* 
-1.15 
(-3.23)* 
-0.86 
(-2.46)** 
-1.33 
(-4.59)* 
Per cap. GDP -0.01 
(-1.00) 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
-0.04 
(-2.85)* 
-0.02 
(-1.84)^ 
-0.05 
(-2.31)# 
-0.09 
(-2.02)# 
-0.10 
(-2.46)# 
-0.06 
(-2.41)# 
Gov. balance -0.03 
(-2.61)* 
-0.04 
(-3.01)* 
-0.04 
(-2.23)# 
-0.03 
(-3.04)* 
    
Dcrep 0.01 
(2.32)# 
0.002 
(0.60) 
0.01 
(2.92)* 
0.01 
(2.05)# 
0.01 
(1.75)^ 
0.004 
(1.15) 
0.01 
(1.47) 
0.004 
(1.42) 
Resimp -0.02 
(-4.84)* 
-0.02 
(-4.11)* 
-0.02 
(-2.92)* 
-0.02 
(-4.97)* 
-0.03 
(-3.29)* 
-0.03 
(-2.83)* 
-0.04 
(-3.41)* 
-0.02 
(-3.08)* 
Resdebt 0.004 
(2.357)# 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
0.004 
(2.16)# 
    
Inflation 0.0001 
(2.12)# 
0.0001 
(1.45) 
0.0003 
(1.64) 
0.0002 
(2.58)* 
0.02 
(1.55) 
0.01 
(1.28) 
0.02 
(1.66)^ 
0.02 
(1.91)^ 
Openness -0.004 
(-2.34)# 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
-0.004 
(-1.68)^ 
-0.004 
(-2.28)# 
    
Floating 0.53 
(3.81)* 
0.74 
(4.56)* 
-0.03 
(-0.09) 
0.39 
(2.63)* 
0.19 
(0.65) 
0.16 
(0.68) 
-0.09 
(-0.38) 
0.10 
(0.45) 
Intermediate 0.09 
(0.65) 
1.01 
(6.32)* 
0.18 
(1.07) 
0.37 
(2.83)* 
0.34 
(1.39) 
-0.43 
(-1.33) 
-0.45 
(-1.88)^ 
-0.06 
(-0.26) 
Observations 1370        1168 706 1345 581 418 472 581 
Obs.= 0 1260 1079 644 1236 540 388 436 540 
Obs.= 1 110 89 62 109 41 30 36 41 
LR Stat. 85.558 95.553 58.586 79.946 25.644 23.243 31.088 23.987 
Prob. LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden R2 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.11 012 008 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is currency crises. z -statistics are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent 
level, (#) at the 5 per cent and (^) at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
In order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit in the models, we carry out two goodness-of-fit 
tests: the power of the models in predicting a currency crisis in the sample and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test. The standard method of a probit model to evaluate its predictive power is to 
compare the estimated probabilities of a crisis with actual occurrences. For this purpose, a 
probability threshold was set to serve as a criterion for the decision whether a model signals a 
crisis or not. In case the probability of a crisis exceeds the threshold or cut-off level, the model 
is considered to send a signal and vice versa. Using a cut-off level for the probability of a crisis 
as 50%, the models issue hardly any wrong signals, but they missed most of the crises in the 
sample22. As shown in Table 7, the probability threshold, as the value separating the crisis 
period from the tranquil period, was set at 15%.  
 
                                               
21 LR statistic is analogous to the F statistic in the models estimated OLS. 
22 Similar to the results surveyed by Berg and Pattillo (1999) our diagnostic statistics reveal that the models rarely 
generate a predicted probability of crises above 50%. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Currency Crises in Emerging and 
Developing Countries 
 Emerging Economies Developing Countries 
Natural LYS HMR De jure Natural LYS HMR De jure 
Constant -0.44 
(-0.89) 
-1.73 
(-2.47)# 
-0.35 
(-0.59) 
-0.32 
(-0.66) 
-1.52 
(-10.95)* 
-1.52 
(-9.76)* 
-1.52 
(-6.16)* 
-1.46 
(-11.09)* 
Per cap. GDP 0.087 
(-3.59)* 
-0.10 
(-3.32)* 
-0.10 
(-2.61)* 
-0.06 
(-2.56)* 
    
Gov. balance -0.09 
(-3.59)* 
0.02 
(0.38) 
0.10 
(1.06) 
0.06 
(1.14) 
-0.03 
(-3.42)* 
-0.03 
(-2.53)# 
-0.07 
(-3.99)* 
-0.03 
(-3.58)* 
Dcrep 0.01 
(2.36)# 
0.004 
(0.91) 
0.01 
(1.57) 
0.01 
(1.42) 
    
Domfin 0.05 
(0.71) 
0.06 
(0.84) 
0.10 
(0.99) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
    
Resimp -0.06 
(-4.31)* 
-0.04 
(-3.07)* 
-0.03 
(-2.40)# 
-0.05 
(-4.25)* 
-0.01 
(-2.47)# 
-0.02 
(-2.97)* 
-0.01 
(-0.64) 
-0.01 
(-2.61)* 
Resdebt 0.01 
(1.27) 
0.01 
(0.74) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(1.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.02 
(-1.45) 
-0.0004 
(-0.17) 
Debt 0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.03 
(-0.65) 
-0.04 
(-0.73) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
    
Debtsx     0.001 
(0.37) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.49) 
0.003 
(0.89) 
Inflation 4.70e05 
(0.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
0.004 
(1.04) 
8.83e06 
(0.04) 
    
Openness -0.002 
(-0.54) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
-0.0002 
(-0.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.50)* 
    
Floating -0.19 
(-0.52) 
1.05 
(2.10)# 
-9.99 
(-0.88) 
0.26 
(0.71) 
0.35 
(2.62)* 
0.55 
(3.09)* 
0.89 
(1.29) 
0.22 
(1.39) 
Intermediate 0.41 
(1.59) 
1.27 
(2.41)# 
-0.34 
(-1.01) 
-0.18 
(-0.59) 
0.13 
(0.88) 
0.90 
(5.79)* 
0.49 
(2.39)# 
0.17 
(1.15) 
Observations 377 318 261 388 1210 1021 437 1191 
Obs.= 0 345 294 241 355 1114 943 396 1095 
Obs.= 1 32 24 20 33 96 78 41 96 
LR Stat. 58.506 49.226 39.708 54.244 37.567 61.257 28.836 34.472 
Prob. LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden R2 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.05 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is currency crises. z -statistics are displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance at the 1 per cent 
level, (#) at the 5 per cent and (^) at the 10 per cent level. 
Source: Author's estimates. 
 
Lowering the cut-off level to 15% leads to a strong improvement in the models' ability to 
predict currency crises in the sample, while the number of wrong signals rises only moderately. 
Also, the majority of correct predictions are for tranquil periods23. Given the cut-off probability 
of 15% the models correctly call between 15.5% and 70.8% of the crises and between 84% 
and 96.7% of the tranquil periods. Also, the count R2 indicates a relatively good goodness-of-fit 
in the models (see Table 8)24.  
 
 
                                               
23 We also used a cut-off level for the probability of a crisis as 25%, but the models accurately predicted crises in 
emerging and developing countries particularly using LYS and de Jure classifications. 
24 The count R2 is another comparatively simple measure of goodness-of-fit. It is defined as: 
 Count R2 =
number of correct predictions
total number of observations
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Table 7: Goodness-of-Fit of the Probit Models 
 
Classification 
 
Predicts 
All countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Tranquil Crises Tranquil Crises Tranquil Crises Tranquil Crises 
Natural Tranquil 1129 70 511 29 307 12 1029 79 
Crises 131 40 29 12 48 21 85 17 
LYS Tranquil 938 49 350 22 253 7 837 48 
Crises 141 40 38 8 41 17 106 30 
HMR Tranquil 567 37 385 22 213 10 343 27 
Crises 77 25 51 14 10 10 53 14 
De Jure Tranquil 1129 76 522 32 293 12 1028 81 
Crises 107 33 18 9 52 20 67 15 
     
     Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Table 8: Measure of Goodness-of-Fit: The Count R2 
Classification All Countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Natural          R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.90 R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.86 
LYS      R2 = 0.84 R2 = 0.86 R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.85 
HMR            R2 = 0.84 R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.85 R2 = 0.82 
De Jure          R2 = 0.86 R2 = 0.91 R2 = 0.83 R2 = 0.88 
     
      Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Alternatively, if the average of the predicted values approaches the average of the 
observed outcomes successfully, a model is considered to be well fitted. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test statistics are commonly used to assess these properties. In order to calculate 
these test statistics, the data set is sorted in ascending order by the predicted probability of a 
currency crisis. The data set is then split into the subsets by grouping the first quantile of 
observations into the first set, and so forth. For each subset, the difference between the 
observed and predicted number of currency crises is determined on which the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test statistics are based. Most Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics lead to not 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference between observed and predicted values at 10% 
level (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
Classification All Countries Advanced Emerging Developing 
Natural          χ2 (8) = 4.33(0.83)  χ2 (8) = 8.69(0.37) χ2 (8) = 9.28(0.32) χ2 (8) = 7.29(0.51) 
LYS      χ2 (8) = 2.79(0.95)  χ2 (8) = 2.52(0.96) χ2 (8) = 3.76(0.88) χ2 (8) = 3.82(0.87) 
HMR            χ2 (8) = 5.91(0.65)  χ2 (8) = 8.08(0.43) χ2 (8) = 4.49(0.81) χ2 (8) = 4.72(0.79) 
De Jure          χ2 (8) = 9.97(0.27)  χ2 (8) = 7.96(0.44)  χ2 (8) = 9.25(0.32)  χ2 (8) = 5.71(0.68) 
       
       Source: Author's calculations. 
 
Considering the results shown in Tables 5 and 6, can be pointed out that the probability of 
currency crises increases along with a low ratio of foreign reserves to import of goods and 
services, high inflation, increases in the ratio of domestic financing to GDP and the ratio of 
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domestic credit to private sector to GDP, low ratio of international reserves to total debt and 
increases in the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income. As expected, increases in per 
capita GDP growth rate, among others, reduce the probability of currency crises.  
 
Table 10: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Currency Crises       
 Natural LYS HMR De Jure 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking from the 
best to the worst 
performance 
All Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating 
Advanced Economies 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Emerging Economies 
Floating 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Fixed 
Floating* 
Developing Countries 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating 
Fixed 
Floating 
Intermediate 
Fixed 
Intermediate 
Floating* 
Fixed 
Intermediate* 
Floating* 
      
     Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
     Source: Author's calculations. 
 
In addition, our results suggest that floating and intermediate exchange regimes are 
associated with a higher probability of currency crises than fixed regimes (see Table 10). 
Developing countries using fixed arrangements have a lower likelihood of currency crises 
relative to similar countries using floating or intermediate regimes. An explanation is that 
countries with underdeveloped or weak financial systems are also likely to have problems 
accommodating large exchange rate movements under flexible regimes.  
For advanced and emerging economies, our results are not clear. They are sensitive to 
regime classification and different classifications can lead to very different results. 
Notwithstanding this, when the HMR classification is used in emerging countries, floating 
regimes show the best performance (not statistically significant) while emerging countries 
using fixed regimes increase the probability of currency crises. Conversely, when our model is 
applied to all the samples the results suggested that fixed arrangements are less prone to 
currency crises. These result are similar to findings by Ghosh et al. (2002); Falcetti and Tudela 
(2006), Haile and Pozo (2006) and Esaka (2010b), and contrary to Bubula and Otker-Rober 
(2003). However, when we use the LYS classification is found that intermediate exchange 
regimes are more prone to currency crises in all countries, as well as, in emerging and 
developing economies. These results could show a lower popularity of intermediate regimes, 
according to Rogoff et al. (2003). As a consequence, our results do not clarify whether floating 
or intermediate exchange arrangements are more prone to currency crises. 
To summarise, currency crises tend to occur more frequently in countries using floating or 
intermediate regimes than those countries using fixed regimes, but it is not clear which 
exchange rate regime is more prone to currency crises. These results tend to suggest that the 
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affirmations on emerging and developing countries should allow for more exchange rate 
flexibility as a means to reduce the probability of currency and financial crises is not well 
founded. 
 
8 Concluding Remarks 
The academic debate on the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a country or 
group of countries has been one of the most controversial topics in theoretical and empirical 
literature. Notwithstanding its increasing relevance to policy, the literature offers relatively few 
empirical studies about the impact of the exchange rate regime on a currency crisis in 
developed, emerging and developing countries, separately. This article has provided an 
empirical analysis of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on currency crises in 
advanced, emerging and developing countries. To this end, we have attempted to make two 
contributions. To begin with, we distinguish between the de jure and the three de facto 
classifications system. We have used the IMF de jure classification and checked the 
robustness of our results with three different de facto classifications: the LYS classification 
based on a clustered analysis, the natural classification based mainly on market determined 
dual and parallel exchange rates, and the HMR classification based on exchange rate regimes 
and taking into account external shocks and revaluations. The most complete de facto 
exchange rate classifications are made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
Secondly, our results also suggest that currency crises tend to occur more frequently in 
developing countries with floating or intermediate regimes and, also, with higher ratio of 
domestic financing to GDP, higher ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP and lower 
ratio of international reserves to imports, among other indicators, than developing countries 
adopting fixed arrangements. However, the results are not clear in terms of which exchange 
rate regime is more prone to currency crises. Conversely, our results on which exchange rate 
regimes increase the probability of currency crises in emerging and advanced economies that 
already have well developed financial sectors are not clear. They are sensitive to regime 
classification because different classifications can lead to very different results.  
 
References 
Angkinand, A.; Chiu, E. M. P. and Willett, T. D. (2009). Testing the unstable middle and two 
corners hypotheses about exchange rate regimes. Open Economies Review, 20(1). 
Pp. 61-83. 
Asici, A. A. (2011). Exchange rate regime choice and currency crises. Economic Systems, 
35(3). Pp. 419-436. 
Bailliu, J.; Lafrance, R. and Perrault, J.-F. (2001). Exchange Rate Regimes and Economic 
Growth in Emerging Markets. In Revisiting the Case for Flexible Exchange Rates. Pp. 
317-345. Bank of Canada. 
Bailliu, J.; Lafrance, R. and Perrault, J.-F. (2003). Does exchange rate policy matter for growth. 
International Finance, 6 (3). Pp. 381-414. 
Berg, A. and Pattillo, C. (1999). Are currency crises predictable? A test. IMF Staff Papers, 
46(2). Pp. 107-138. 
Bérnassy-Quéré, A.; Coeure, B. and Mignon, V. (2006). On the identification of de facto 
currency pegs. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 20(1). Pp. 112-
127. 
17 of 18 
Bubula, A. and Otker-Rober, I. (2002). The evolution of exchange rate regimes since 1990: 
Evidence from de fact policies. Working Paper WP/02/155. International Monetary 
Fund. 
Bubula, A. and Otker-Rober, I. (2003). Are pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes 
more crisis prone? Working Paper WP/03/223, International Monetary Fund. 
Calvo, G. and Reinhart, C. (2002). Fear of Floating. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVII(2). 
Pp. 379-408. 
Combes, J-L.; Minea, A. and Sow, M. (2016). Crises and exchange rate regimes: Time to 
break down the bipolar view. Applied Economics. Published online: 16 Mar 2016. Pp. 
1-17. 
Coulibaly, B. (2009). Currency unions and currency crises: An empirical assessment. 
International Journal of Finance & Economics, 14(3). Pp. 199-221. 
Cruz-Rodríguez, A. (2013). Choosing and assessing exchange rate regimes: A survey of the 
literature. Revista de Análisis Económico, 28(2). Pp. 37-61. 
Dubas, J.M.; Lee, B.-J. and Mark, N.C.  (2005). Effective exchange rate classifications and 
growth. Working Paper 11272, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Eichengreen, B., Rose, A. K., and Wyplosz, C. (1996). Contagious currency crises: First tests. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98. Pp. 463-484. 
Esaka, T. (2010a). Exchange rate regimes, capital control and currency crises: Does the 
bipolar view hold? Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 
20(1). Pp. 91-108. 
Esaka, T. (2010b). De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes 
with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks? Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 34(6). Pp. 1109-1128. 
Esaka, T. (2014). Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises? Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 44. Pp. 136-163. 
Falcetti, E. and Tudela, M. (2006). Modelling currency crises in emerging markets: A dynamic 
probit model with unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics, 68(4). Pp. 445-471. 
Frankel, J. and Wei, S.-J.  (2008). Estimation of de facto exchange rate regimes: Synthesis of 
the techniques for inferring flexibility and basket weights. IMF Staff Papers, 55 (3). Pp. 
384-416. 
Girton, L. and Roper, D. (1977). A monetary model of exchange market pressure applied to the 
postwar Canadian experience. American Economic Review, 67. Pp. 537-548. 
Ghosh, A. R., Gulde, A.-M., Ostry, J. D., and Wolf, H. (1997). Does the nominal exchange rate 
regime matter? Working Paper Series 5874. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ghosh, A. R., Gulde, A.-M., and Wolf, H. C. (2002). Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices and 
Consequences. The MIT Press. 
Ghosh, A. R.; Ostry, J. D. and Qureshi, M. S. (2015). Exchange rate management and crisis 
susceptibility: A Reassessment. IMF Economic Review, 63(1). Pp. 238-276. 
Haile, F. D. and Pozo, S. (2006). Exchange rate regimes and currency crises: An evaluation 
using extreme value theory. Review of International Economics, 14(4). Pp. 554-570. 
Habermeier, K.; Kokenyne, A.; Veyrune, R. and Anderson, H. (2009). Revised system for the 
classification of exchange rate arrangements. Working Paper WP/09/211. International 
Monetary Fund. 
Husain, A. M., Mody, A., and Rogoff, K. S. (2005). Exchange rate regime durability and 
performance in developing versus advanced economies. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 52. Pp. 35-64. 
Ilzetski, E., Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K., (2010). The Country Chronologies and Background 
Material to Exchange Rate Arrangements into the 21st Century: Will the Anchor 
Currency Hold? Unpublished manuscript. 
IMF (1997). World Economic and Financial Surveys, chapter World Economic Outlook, pages 
78-97. International Monetary Fund. Washington. 
18 of 18 
Jakubiak, M. (2001). Choice of the exchange rate regime and currency crashes: Evidence of 
some emerging economies. In Dabrowski, M. (editor). Currency Crises in Emerging 
Markets: Selected Comparative Studies, volume 41 of Case Reports, pages 29-46. 
Center for Social and Economic Research. 
Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., and Reinhart, C. (1998). Leading indicators of currency crises. Staff 
Papers, 45(1). Pp. 1-48. 
Karimi, M. and Voia, M. C. (2014). Currency Crises, Exchange Rate Regimes and Capital 
Account Liberalization: A Duration Analysis Approach. In Schleer-van Gellecom, 
Frauke (Editor). Advances in Non-linear Economic Modeling: Theory and Applications. 
Serie Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, Vol. 17. 
Levy-Yeyati, E. and Sturzenergger, F. (2005). Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. 
words. European Economic Review, 49. Pp.1603-1635. 
Peltonen, T. A. (2006). Are emerging market currency crises predictable? A test. Working 
Paper Series 571. European Central Bank. 
Poirson, H. (2002). How do countries choose their exchange rate regime? Working Paper 
WP/01/46, International Monetary Fund. 
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. S. (2004). The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A 
reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIX(1). Pp.1-48. 
Rogoff, K. S., Husain, A. M., Mody, A., Brooks, R., and Oomes, N. (2003). Evolution and 
performance of exchange rate regimes. Working Paper WP/03/243, International 
Monetary Fund. 
Sachs, J., Tornell, A., and Velasco, A. (1996). Financial crises in emerging markets: The 
lessons from 1995. Brooking Papers on Economy Activity, (1). Pp. 147-215. 
Shambaugh, J. C. (2004). The effect of fixed exchange rates on monetary policy. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 119 (1). Pp. 330-357. 
Tudela, M. (2004). Explaining currency crises: A duration model approach. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 23. Pp. 799-816. 
